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Abstract 
The Walter Reed Institute of Army Research developed the antimalarial drug mefloquine 
then collaborated with Hoffman-La Roche to produce the drug under its brand name “Lariam,” 
after Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved licensure in 1989.  For over twenty years, 
the Army used this pill as its “drug of choice” for soldiers deployed to endemic regions until 
2009, and in 2013 the Food and Drug Administration warned that the drug’s neurotoxic effects 
could be lasting, if not permanent. The sociopolitical exigence of developing a new biochemical 
antimalarial drug rushed the development and licensure processes, and the modern craving for 
certainty in the New Drug Application (NDA) process led to a biomedical disaster— 
economically, politically, and interpersonally. In this paper, I present the factors contributing to 
uncertainty and heightened exigence in the development of what I call “mef-Lariam” in a nod to 
Latourian hybridization. By tracing the history of the drug’s development process, I argue that 
definitional stasis around the NDA genre’s terms safe and effective undergird a dangerous 
ontological orientation to medicine that privileges an ethic of expediency. Finally, I argue that 
actor-network theory can help medical rhetors apply a more ethical, multiple view of medical 
research that could prevent the future licensure of toxic pharmaceuticals.  
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Introduction 
The truth, or at least what my family, the State Department, the Fulbright Organization, 
and I have determined as the truth is that the psychotic break, the hallucinations, the 
amnesia— it all was an extreme side effect of the Lariam, the anti-malarial drug that was 
a prescription of choice in those days. It's got a reputation for doing things like what 
happened to me, as well as much worse. 
 –David MacLean, guest on This American Life, NPR 
Technical Communication, Praxis, and Pharmaceuticals 
Mefloquine hydrochloride was the result of a major Army-run Vietnam-era malaria drug 
discovery program that began in 1963, and it received Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
licensure under the brand name “Lariam” in 1989. In 2013, the malaria prophylaxis received the 
strictest warning that the FDA puts on drugs, and pharmaceutical company Hoffman-La Roche 
(Roche) stopped manufacturing the drug. The FDA’s “black box warning” explained that the 
drug’s neurotoxic effects might be lasting, if not permanent. While this case is not consistently 
framed as a “crisis,” it has received significant media attention, with the publication of David 
MacLean’s memoir The Answer to the Riddle is Me, New York Times articles, National Public 
Radio segments, and a 60 Minutes special. Most of these outlets find ready victims but struggle 
around the construction of a perpetrator, alluding to Roche, the FDA, and the drug itself, but 
many of them come back to the technical documentation that accompanied the pill. In fact, the 
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FDA’s own response, as serious side effects were reported, was to rectify the wrongdoing by 
turning to the prescription labels, revising and increasing warnings. 
Latourian actor-network theory can reveal agency in a historical crisis case by bringing to 
the surface the actants that contributed to said crisis. The flattened network of actants involved in 
the FDA licensure of mef-Lariam reveals that sociopolitical exigence rushed the development 
process, scientific stakeholders’ narrow definition of “effective” excluded concerns of mental 
health and noncompliance, and the New Drug Application prioritized a positivistic view of 
efficacy over effectiveness and safety. Ultimately, the lack of definitional stasis around the terms 
“safe” and “effective” among NDA stakeholders including lab scientists, pharmaceutical 
developers, and regulations officers as well as a sloppy translation of those terms to public 
audiences led to the premature licensure and marketing of Lariam. 
The main contributing factors to the FDA licensure of mefloquine were (1) sociopolitical 
exigence that rushed the development process, (2) a narrow definition of “effective” that 
excludes concerns of mental health and likelihood of noncompliance, and (3) the deprioritization 
of safety in NDA masked by euphemistic warnings. These factors are not particularly 
problematic at development stages and during the construction of scientific facts and 
experiments within research contexts, and in fact they are particularly unique to emerging drugs. 
However, in the drug development practice, as with most scientific innovation, there is a point at 
which research findings are translated to recommendations and policy. In the case of mef-
Lariam, an inexplicit definition of “effective” allowed for an ethic based on efficacy and 
expediency, motivating researchers prevented regulatory writers from accurately translating 
findings from medicinal chemistry labs and clinical trials into precautions and warnings on 
pharmaceutical labels for public consumer audiences.  
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Consumers are met with pharmaceuticals daily. Casual patients heed warnings of side 
effects and weigh the risks of taking and not popping pills for particular conditions, deciding 
whether the pain pill that induces wooziness and prohibits driving will be worth skipping out on 
a late trip to the store or whether the blood-thinning ibuprofen is a better option than wine for a 
headache, knowing that combining the two is a bad idea. Recent outbreaks of antiquated and 
preventable illnesses like polio and measles illuminate public weariness of side effects, with the 
vaccination debate making a case for rhetorical intervention in medical risk communication.  
The romantic and widespread view of western biomedicine is that it evolves with 
technological advances and responds to emerging disease. However, as with any field, medicine 
is plagued by a number of situational factors like policy, regulation, approval boards, etc. At the 
consumer level, drugs appear as little miracle substances. Take them and feel better. Take them 
and prevent feeling bad. The assumption is that Science has proven the drug’s safety and value. 
However, behind the scenes in drug discovery are in-depth analyses and discussions over how 
findings should be interpreted and presented. Developers adjust dosages and observe results use 
the best equipment they can access or create within time and budget constraints. Often, 
stakeholders disagree about what particular data sets from the field mean and negotiate how they 
should be translated into policy and consumer recommendations. This thesis follows the case of 
one drug, revealing the complimentary roles of kairos and exigence in the drug discovery and 
production processes to examine how sociopolitical exigence leads to a lack of definitional stasis 
among stakeholders (biochemists, FDA regulators, and physician/patient consumers) around the 
terms “safe” and “effective” in new drug applications and licensure.  
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Literature Review.  Recent literature in the field of technical communication indicates 
a turn away from current traditional practices to new considerations of culture and power 
(Longo, 2000; Scott, Longo & Wills, 2006; Roberts, 2006; Mirel, 2002). This move is crucial to 
the scholarship as it responds to the claim of J. Blake Scott, Bernadette Longo, and Katherine V. 
Wills (2006) that “hyperpragmatism continues to dominate technical communication research 
and teaching, even coopting those practices that could be transformative” (p. 8). As they note, 
Carolyn Miller’s work on revealing and critiquing the extremist logical positivist approach to 
technical writing since the early twentieth century has been fundamental in bringing technical 
communication back to the humanities (Miller, 1979, p. 17). In fact, as Longo argues in her 
historical book Spurious Coin (2000), when viewed as “cultural artifacts,” technical documents 
are uniquely situated to reveal institutional power structures.  
In an analysis of Nazi memos, Steve Katz (1992) highlights the ability of well-written 
technical documents to obscure a lack of ethos. He points out that a document can be rhetorically 
sound and functional within its own discourse community to explain that it will nevertheless 
adapt the ethics of the organization that it is representing. He calls this “not an anomaly nor a 
problem in technical writing only, but a problem of deliberative rhetoric” (p. 258), citing 
Aristotle’s distinction of deliberative rhetoric as that which aims to get work done for the future. 
Katz distinguishes the tendency to embrace the basing of a moral standpoint on expediency and 
technology as “predominant in Western culture” (p. 258). As a manifestation of human character, 
he argues, ethos defines technical writers’ ethics. When an organization’s ethics are 
epistemologically based on a search for objective “Truth,” then its morals tend to adopt similar 
foundations in an ethic of expediency.  
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Technical communication in medicine is no exception to this argument. In fact, the role 
of regulatory agencies is to check this ethic of expediency in drug development. While not 
necessarily immoral—prophylactic drugs emerge to prevent death and illness—this ethic 
represents an epistemology that privileges speed and objective efficacy over effectiveness and 
safety. Perhaps for this reason, the primary regulating body of food and drugs in the West, the 
FDA, focuses on the topoi safe and effective. While these terms invoke the morality of the 
original Hippocratic Oath, an ethic of expediency underlies them, and consequently allows 
rhetors to wrap them into the trope of an objective efficacy. This becomes apparent when the 
document leaves the context of the organizations that subscribe to this ethic as the basis of their 
communication, in other words, when it leaves the realm of Western science and technology. 
The safety and effectiveness of mef-Lariam are questioned by the public patient’s sense of 
morality. Proponents of the drug within the FDA and WRAIR react to the public’s perception 
that this is an unsafe antimalarial in divergent ways, from continuing to back the pill’s 
biochemical ingenuity to questioning the military’s field prescription, thus revealing their 
individual ethic. 
As a subdiscipline, the rhetoric of medicine has gained traction within rhetoric, and 
recent studies have focused on medical technologies (Graham, 2009), multiple ontologies in 
medicine (Mol, 2002; Graham & Herndl, 2013), and feminist theory (Koerber, 2005; Hausman, 
2013; Condit, 1994). However, it is important to remember that the practice of mas Katz’s 
edicine in an institution-driven western system relies most primarily on policies and public 
health campaigns that dictate normative solutions to threats of disease. Some scholarship within 
technical communication circles has begun this work of engaging with real practice in the field 
through case studies of public health responses (Gong &Dragga, 2008; Ding, 2013; Danisch & 
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Mudry, 2008), and this work needs to continue to complement theories of technical 
communication, particularly in regard to medicine.  
As a technoscience, medical campaigns mix pure sciences (e.g. chemistry) and applied 
sciences (e.g. public health). Thus, campaign failures carry with them a nearly infinite number of 
culprits; while lawsuits often attack medical malpractice, doctors might turn the finger towards 
bad policy or protocol. Rarely, however, do public responses to failures in medicine go back as 
far as research communities, taking the effectiveness of drugs and instruments for granted. A 
debate that focuses on proximal causes ignores underlying assumptions about the construction of 
facts in scientific discourse. Meanwhile, a case study approach to researching problems in 
medical communication allows researchers to understand then circumvent a surface-level debate 
over proximal causes and instead unfold the root of agency by analyzing the texts that construct 
and illuminate social networks.  
From a modern standpoint, malaria prevention in nonimmune travelers is a biochemical 
affair. Sporozoites in the plasmodium-infected female Anopheles mosquito enter into the human 
bloodstream, setting off a sequence of events that lead to malarial infection. Thus, if 
pharmacologists can synthesize a compound that inhibits the heme polymerase that malaria 
parasites release to infect host cells, they have prevented malaria at the cellular level (Hawley, 
Bray, Mungthin, Atkinson, O’Neill & Ward, 1998). Medicinal chemists experience uncertainty 
in terms of structural formulas, derivatives, and synthesis while pharmacologists experiment with 
bioavailability, excretion, and toxicity. One transition in scientific ontology happens when a drug 
passes from experimentation with theoretical compounds to experimentation with animals and 
humans. Another transition happens at the regulatory level as medical officers translate 
pharmacology reports into dosage approvals and endorsements. Governing agencies like the 
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American Centers for Disease Control (CDC) then translate these findings into recommendations 
for public audiences (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Drug Research Process 
Functionally, these roles overlap but allow subject experts to focus on sets of achievable tasks. 
Ideologically, however, these breaks tend to segment pure and applied sciences, with medicinal 
chemistry authors writing about internal biochemical interactions and pharmacologists writing 
about external corporal results of those interactions. According to this model of division, 
sociological factors emerge at the regulatory and especially the public health phases of a drug’s 
development, far removed from the initial chemical conception of it.  
However, a divided model of conceptualizing drugs in this way wrongly establishes 
medicinal chemistry as a practice without social context.  No matter how much institutions 
distinguish biology as a natural science and studies of the humanities as social, at its core, the 
separation is a false binary. Latour (1999) blows out the contradiction of modernity, 
problematizing the nature/culture dichotomy, which fails to account for the proliferation of 
acting hybrids (combinations of Nature and culture) that make up our sociopolitical landscape 
and constitute decisions about how people use science, which is never really pure because it is 
also “made” in sociopolitical contexts. This false binary resonates in the halls of contemporary 
institutions as “pure” science separates itself from social sciences and the humanities. In fields of 
health and medicine, this iteration actualizes itself in the health/medicine divide, with “public 
health” officials doing the social work of distributing the pure medicine that biochemists 
develop.  
Medicinal 
Chemistry
Pharmacology Regulation
Public Health 
Campaign
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The impossibility of this divide is perhaps nowhere as important to note and warn against 
as it is in global health. Not only is public health fundamentally a rhetorical practice rife with 
behavior change models (how do we persuade people to act on behalf of their health) but it also 
relies on the contradiction of modern medicine. Public health solutions to malaria demonstrate 
the hybrid nature of doing healthcare; pure chemistry has not been able to eradicate the parasite 
at universal rates. On the one hand, environmental action reliant on widespread use of DDT 
eradicated malaria from the U.S., suggesting that the solution to the environmental problem was 
found. But even in a western context, 
eradication did not occur at even rates, 
and southern states were last to 
experience relief (see Figure 2).1 
Furthermore, in the U.S. and 
Europe, the parasite continues to adapt 
and thrive in economically marginalized 
global regions. So, while seemingly 
scientific answers have worked in 
contexts that support the dominant western approach to health, development organizations have 
moved to social and cultural answers in other contexts, often assuming the logic “if we educate 
them (of the science), they will change their behavior and malaria will end.” Dutta (2008) 
developed the culture-centered approach to health communication that “questions the 
                                                 
1 The “Global South,” a trending term proposed to replace “third world” and describe marginalized 
countries of the southern hemisphere, is reminiscent of the colloquial “Dirty South,” referencing the agrarian region 
of the American South that has traditionally suffered from fewer job opportunities and political capital in the 
American system.  
Figure 2: Distribution of malaria in the United States, 
1882-1935. (Report for Certification and Registration of 
Malaria Eradication from United States of America 
published by PAHO/WHO, December 1969) 
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constructions of culture in traditional health communication theories and applications, examines 
how the latter have systematically erased the cultural voices of marginalized communities in 
their construction of health, and builds dialogical spaces for engaging with these voices” (p. 4). 
This approach helps explain the violent marginalization that results from basing an entire 
network of policy on the foundations of a dominant perspective of western biomedicine that rests 
on a positivistic view of biochemical fact.  
Distributed Agency. Claiming, “we have never been modern,” Latour (1979) 
emphasizes the need for bridging the gap between social and life sciences; a gap that helps the 
life sciences maintain authoritative roles as experts of matter and thus divert blame to those who 
use or interpret the facts they reveal. By distinguishing “pure” fields like medicinal chemistry 
from applications of them, social context is removed and emergent facts are seemingly universal 
until disproven. One way in which this ontology is harmful and inaccurate is that it presents a 
kind of pure science that is void of uncertainty. 
In the pharmaceutical science, what really happens in the research communities that 
develop the biological knowledge to produce new drugs is represented by publications with titles 
such as, “A Process Similar to Autophagy Is Associated with Cytocidal Chloroquine Resistance 
in Plasmodium falciparum” (emphases mine) (Gaviria et al., 2013). In research article titles, 
modifiers distance hard fact from preliminary research, and limited methods are revealed, even 
openly presented. Debate over the efficacy of animal testing for human biomedical responses, 
messy international clinical trials, loose reporting, favoritism in observation based on 
tangentially related studies, and a culture of competitive research grant proposing to institutes 
like those that comprise the National Institutes of Health all point to a field enveloped by 
uncertainty.  
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In fact, most biomedical journal articles report descriptive accounts of observations in 
specific contexts but don’t presume to project generalizations as main objectives. That’s the 
policy maker’s job. Collins and Evans (2002) establish a Third Wave of Science Studies that 
“turns...on a normative theory of expertise” (p. 249). Without removing different kinds of 
understanding from the network, they emphasize that the expertise of scientists is different from 
that of the policy maker, which in turn differs from that of the public. As actants that are part of 
the network, contributing to the artifact that is mef-Lariam neurotoxicity, these experts receive 
varying degrees of information, especially amidst variables such as dosages and half-lives that 
are adjusted frequently during clinical trials, making stasis difficult. 
At different points in time during the drug development process, one actant may take the 
reins as more agentive for progressing the project, but ultimately, the agency of public 
acceptance, policy, regulation, and medical research is distributed across a network rather than 
passed from one player to the next. When a basketball team loses on a missed buzzer beater, 
announcers and spectators may shame the shooter for her inaccuracy, but teammates and coaches 
will account for the moments leading up to the shot that put them in a shootout situation, 
counting every turnover and lackadaisical practice and attributing the loss to infinite factors. 
Networked agency accounts for a team of expertise. It can also lead to finger pointing in 
different directions, as victims of some perceived wrong-doing seek proximal causes to blame.  
While the discursive transition of uncertainty into certainty for the sake of a modern 
Science is not inherently problematic for the way that it functions in regulatory documentation, 
one only has to follow the network down the line a bit farther to see the considerable long-term 
problems for all stakeholders of positioning that certainty at the center of policy decisions and 
packaging it to public audiences as Science.  While a Public use collapses ideas of safety with 
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effectiveness and efficacy. By proposing that the drug was effective, the FDA is assumed to be 
supporting its safety, for a drug that is deemed unsafe will not be taken and thus cannot be 
effective. The FDA’s conflation of safety with effectiveness isn’t important in the realm of 
biological systems theory or even on the lab bench or in animal experimentation. However, once 
that definition reached praxis, wherein patients experienced hallucinations and other side effects, 
noncompliance deemed that a lack of safety was causal to a lack of effectiveness. 
Aside from questions of expertise and legitimacy, other complications arise along the 
way in the journey from lab to regulation to pillbox label. At every turn, one diversion in the 
Deleuzian line of flight could result in a vastly different outcome. If a project is unfunded, new 
knowledge fails to emerge, but if a project is highly anticipated, then all knowledge about it is 
privileged early, and perceived progress is pushed forward as fact. If we pull out of the war that 
necessitated a new, inexpensive antimalarial, the Army research program shuts down, leaving 
nonmilitary travelers (business travelers, Peace Corps volunteers, etc.) to use alternatives. Such a 
move could also means that academic researchers take over the project, spend more time 
justifying their work to the International Review Board and to funding agencies, and all clinical 
trials are run under a different code of ethics and definition of efficacy, giving researchers the 
chance to recognized neurotoxicity. Organizations like the IRB and NIH are able to police the 
progress of research projects before they leave the institution, requesting that the scientist move 
closer and closer to certainty before pharmaceutical companies move to production. It’s 
important for technical communication scholars, whose work concerns ethics and representation 
and whose skills include discourse analysis and network mapping, to intervene in productions 
and applications of technical documents, particularly in the complicated network of medical 
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regulatory issues working with the various stakeholders around what Wilson and Herndl (2007) 
call “boundary objects.”  
Once research is transcribed into a material object (e.g. a capsule), institutions 
compensate for uncertainty about processes within biological systems at microlevels by flooding 
the public with recommendations, treatment plans, policies, procedures, contraindications, 
dosage guidelines, regulations, side effect warnings, and pamphlets. These post-production texts 
manage a lack of empirical knowledge that starts in the lab and that are unacceptable by a public 
of non-experts. Anticipating these issues, researchers focus on reaching the most comprehensive 
results possible. However, limitations, both epistemological (wherein researchers don’t know 
better, especially in a unique rhetorical situation) and sociopolitical (e.g. pressure to stick to 
project timeline, budgetary restraints), prevent researchers from achieving ideal levels of 
certainty.  On the one hand, for medical breakthroughs to be passed quickly in a capitalist 
structure, they must be monetized. Pharmaceutical companies rely on the outbreak of highly 
exigent diseases and conditions to keep their wheels rolling. Meanwhile, research in public 
institutions moves much slower, waiting on red tape and adhering to regulations. Capital for this 
work in academic contexts, while tied to an economic gain, is more overtly about publications 
and scholarly reputation.  
Technical communication scholars can use artifacts from across the drug discovery 
process to illuminate the rhetoric of compliance and to consider the role of institutional policy 
documents. The field might also begin considering the dual role of medical labels as product 
packaging for consumers and informants for expert advisors such as physicians. As actants in the 
biomedical network move from R&D to communicating that development, they must consider 
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the necessary transition of science from uncertainty in the lab to hard fact in regulation and 
policy to ethically provide the transparency that would benefit a wide range of end users. 
Science studies and Latour’s quasi-objects bring us closer to a functioning take on 
societies and on the functionality of nonhuman and human actors in society construction. Quasi-
objects allow philosophers to provide “social explanations for hard scientific facts” (Latour, 
1993, p. 55), and this is the approach that malarial health and its hard science products need to 
avoid the dualist/dialectic merry go-round ride malarialists have been stuck on.  
This project refers to mefloquine chloride’s material form as “mef-Lariam” in this 
allegiance to the quasi-object that Latour develops. As a material object circulating in a dualist 
policy society, Lariam forces patients to choose: be on the side of Nature, and comply with 
antimalarial policy or be on the side of culture, and deviate from policy, turning your back on 
Science to face the risks. As a quasi-object, mef-Lariam allows patients to consider the messiness 
of biomedical science, and it accepts the capitalist pharmaceutical enterprise as well as 
laboratory uncertainties that arise during drug development and policy decisions. Quasi-objects 
consider expertise as shades of degree, and they allow for varied approaches to solutions. In fact, 
malaria historian Gordon Harrison (1978) classified early approaches to foreign malarial 
endemics as hinging on a definitional divide, writing, “Whereas [Ronald] Ross and [U.S. 
military medic William Crawford] Gorgas thought of malaria control in medical terms and 
sought above all to drive Anopheles from the vicinity of human habitations, (Angelo) Celli, an 
intellectual, historian, and passionate social reformer, saw it essentially as a social problem” (p. 
170). While parasitologists continue to see disease prevention as an offensive attack on 
infectious disease carriers, public health advocates see medicine as a means of defending 
innocent persons against said attack. However, this reduction of the problem only comes on the 
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outside of the black box. In practice, parasitologists understand that their approaches are 
problematic, if for no other reason than malaria’s propensity to build resistance to their 
developments. Nevertheless, the work of malariologists in mitigating these risks as they manifest 
is extremely relevant in keeping up with the disease and maintaining ethos in the present 
environment of intercontinental travel.  
The “world risk society” that Beck (1992) claims new modernity lives relies on the 
framing of risk as monocausal; there must always been a root cause leading to risk, regardless if 
its human or not. However, plasmodium parasites, ever adapting, ever changing in context as 
well as phsyiological makeup, deny a singular cause. As long as biochemists target a particular 
therapy for a particular version of the parasite, they will always be just beyond the reach of a 
solution. Like a child catching lightning bugs in a jar, she will never succeed by opening the jar 
to catch one at a time; the threat of escape arises with every opening. Instead, if the child wants 
to capture all lightning bugs in an area, she must find a way to attract all the bugs with one 
sweep, luring them into the jar. The malaria parasite is always outsmarting Science, and this 
characteristic may be the most threatening aspect of it. Latour (2003) responded to Beck’s 
“remodernization” by explaining, “for Beck and his group the proofs have to be in the substance 
of the phenomena they study, for me only in the collective interpretation given to phenomena 
which, all along, have never been modern” (p. 39, emphases his). He draws a line between 
Beck’s focus on substance and his own on interpretation. The issue with dealing with risk plus 
any version of modernity is that in Beck’s version of society, risks associated with an 
environmental, medical, or other industrial issue, are products of developments and changes 
within these specific industries. However, an ANT approach to modernity posits risks as 
interpretations of interpretations made by or presented to various actants. ANT doesn’t presume 
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to offer a better way of handling risk factors but rather a more realistic way of seeing them as 
subjective interpretations.  
In Pandora’s Hope, Latour (1999) describes the translation of individual actors to a 
collective actants with the example of the popular “guns don’t kill people, people do” argument.. 
He debunks this logic by explaining, “you are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun 
is another object because it has entered into a relationship with you” (p. 179). Replacing Latour’s 
gun with medicine clarifies the nonmodern position on biomedical technologies. When a 
medicine, or for that matter, a parasite, enters into a subject, the two become a third actant. 
Illness itself is a quasi-object; it does not exist without a human host. As an isolated and fixed 
thing, if it were possible to exist as such, mefloquine chloride is purely a technology. It is science 
that happens when C17H16F6N20 combines. But when combined with a human subject, this 
compound binds to brain receptors and inhibits polymerase (we think), preventing plasmodium 
falciparum from entering the blood steam. The human brain without mefloquine is not the 
malarial brain with it. Mefloquine is nothing but a set of elements without the human brain. The 
two combined lead to a new agentive collective, and all of the moving parts and shifting goals of 
this collective must be accounted for in order to move past a circular debate about whose fault 
mefloquine suicides belong to. Moving the technology and the human subject away from isolated 
mechanisms and into varied and constantly changing variables would allow policy makers to 
understand shared responsibility. In fact, this collective itself is the very basis for clinical trials; 
testing the collective as one and observing the effects, and this topic will prove crucial to the 
case.  
Lastly, the divided nature of health and medicine Lastly, the divided nature of health and 
medicine extends violently to create a stigma around mental health issues, wherein health 
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professionals are only now beginning to make headway on legitimizing concerns of mental 
health, albeit these attempts are more often turning to neurorhetorics, framing various disorders 
as neurologic (Jack, 2010).2 By using ANT to bring agentive actants to the surface, it’s possible 
to see what actants were denied agency, failing to enter the network in policy decisions. It’s also 
possible to see what factors motivated the development process at significant nodes, namely 
points in time. If decision makers like the medical officers and label designers are presented with 
the agentive factors motivating particular decisions, then presumably they will be able to make 
decisions from an ethics of healthcare. At minimum, awareness of the larger networks in which 
actants are making decisions would hold them accountable for the ethics to which they prescribe. 
Research Design. Latourian ANT establishes a flat framework for laying out the 
network and elucidating artifacts that define the actants involved in the case.  As a 
historiography, this project relies on surfacing the historic documents that serve as legitimization 
and legal justification for policy decisions and thus informed medical recommendations. Coming 
out of sociology and typically an ethnographic practice, ANT urges, “We have to be as 
undecided as the actors we follow” (Latour, 1987, p. 175, emphasis his). This work doesn’t do 
much digging into private artifacts but rather looks at the common artifacts that scientific, 
regulatory, and ultimately public stakeholders accessed and cross-referenced themselves. Beyond 
                                                 
2 In the 2010 Rhetoric Society Quarterly special issue on Nuerorhetorics, scholars debate the role of 
neurorhetorics in which Jordynn Jack calls on readers to consider the very rhetorical use of the prefix neuro-, 
writing, “the articles in this issue argue for an expanded definition of neurorhetorics that acknowledges these 
impulses [to investigate neural underpinnings of rhetorical topics like pathos and persuasion], but also upholds the 
importance of critical and rhetorical perspectives on discourses involving the brain” (p. 405). Jack’s work on the 
rhetorical framing of autism as a function of neurology rather than as a legitimate illness of its own right. Increasing 
medicalization of mental conditions threatens the legitimacy of lived experiences among patient populations, and 
rhetoricians have seen an opportunity to intervene in the negotiations between neuroscience and expression. 
Unfortunately, such divides tip the scales towards an increasingly divided view of medicine that attributes crises to 
proximal causes. 
 17 
 
narrative case mapping, I apply a discourse analysis approach to determine points at which 
uncertainty defined the mefl-Lariam discovery project in documents that scientists used to 
communicate within their discourse communities, namely chemotherapeutic and 
pharmacological research journal articles. I then analyze the New Drug Application (NDA) 
submitted by Hoffman-La Roche to the FDA. Firstly, however, my goal is to retell the story of 
mefloquine’s development and distribution through a nonmodern lens. 
Lawrence Grossberg (2010) conditions the work of cultural studies, a discipline that aims 
to deeply contextualize discourse, as “messy.” This work is no exception. Part of doing the work 
of tracing is justifying what gets included in the network. If done right, this occurs naturally as 
artifacts discursively present actants. As Latour writes in Science in Action, “From now on, the 
name of the game will be to leave the boundaries open and to close them only when the people 
we follow close them” (p. 175). Of course, my analysis maps my own interpretation and has both 
the insight and limitations of an outsider. After presenting a historical background of the case in 
narrative form below, I use chapters one and two to present discourse analyses of primary journal 
articles that document mef-Lariam’s emergence in the community and the New Drug 
Application that led to FDA licensure, respectively.  
Early War on Malaria: History of Malaria Response (1500 BC-WWI) 
The history of malaria has been fairly consistent— by and large, it is a wartime disease 
confronted by wartime research programs. The parasite has adapted to the biochemical responses 
we’ve thrown at it, and yet researchers continue to take largely the same approach to preventing 
malarial disease. The parallel networks of malaria and of biomedical malarial research have 
followed mostly straight-line trajectories. 
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Malaria’s historic impact on global societies has been devastating, to say the least. If I am 
to trace the relevant factors in this case, that is, the actants that speak, and those that are spoken 
about and demonstrate agency in the flattened network of antimalarial efforts, I must go back as 
far as the earliest documentation of the disease, where the actants begin to taper out. The history 
of medical discourse is rife with war metaphors, political complications, and inequity. These 
figures represent the positivist view of biomedicine that has defined the field at least since Plato 
likened rhetoric to cookery and philosophy to medicine in Gorgias, implying that medicine and 
philosophy led to Truth.  The science wars progressed the paradox of what Richard Bernstein 
(1983) calls “Cartesian anxiety,” but for biomedicine, this positivism goes a long way back.3 
Malaria is one of the oldest and most frustrating infectious diseases for medical scientists and 
practitioners alike. Egyptian papyrus manuscripts presumed to be written by Hippocrates circa 
1500 BC suggest malaria among diseases he documented (Russell, 1955; Garnham, 1966; qtd. in 
Harrison, 1978, p. 265). The disease that Hippocrates documented was identified by periodic 
fever in swamp and marsh areas (Meshnick & Dobson, 2001, p. 15). Chimpanzees and African 
ancestors were known to have chewed leaves of the Vernonia amygdalina shrub, which 
possesses secondary compounds that relieve malaria, and other common botanical materials like 
clove, nutmeg, and onion help destroy plasmodium (Shah, 2010, p. 88).  
Quinine: Humans’ First Synthesized Antimalarial.  The network of malarial reactions 
in dominant western biomedicine goes back to quinine. Heralded as a miracle cure and naturally 
occurring, quinine set out on a line of flight that, upon articulation, could have set off a number 
of possibilities for defining early American healthcare. Had the fact that it was natural and 
                                                 
3  For more on this conversation, see Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
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harvested from tree bark been seen as the grounds for its success, or had it existed in a context of 
other natural remedies, the system of synthetic chemical material development might have 
developed with less anthropocentrism. Nonetheless, the anthropocentrism that does arise from 
biomedical research, wherein researchers create and test chemicals that are seemingly “out there” 
waiting to be tested, is a good place to start the process of tracing in ANT. In the western model 
of healthcare, man and science are most agentive. Thus, tracing the man-chemical hybrids 
illuminates one line of quasi-object agency.  
Meanwhile, bark from the cinchona tree possesses the complex alkaloid quinine, which 
poisons malarial parasites (Shah, 2010, p. 89). Jesuits in South America lauded the bark’s 
success against disease and brought it back to malaria-ridden Europe in the 1630s (Rocco, 2003). 
Of course, at the time, the medicine was considered “anti-Catholic” because of its Jesuit 
association, so it took fifty years to become commonplace in England. Widely distributed by the 
1800s, quinine has been attributed as motivating Britain’s success in its attack in Ghana in 1874 
and thus bringing European imperialism to Africa (Curtain, 1998; Brantlinger, 1985; qtd. in 
Shah, 2010, p. 89). Unfortunately, reserves of the bark were limited, and cinchona seeds didn’t 
make it to Europe until the Dutch smuggled them and spent thirty years tending to their 
cultivation in Indonesia (Shah, 2010, pp. 92-93). Both Dutch and British politics prevented early 
widespread distribution of quinine, with the British producing and selling understrength packets 
on the streets of India and failing to provide levels close to those required for treatment in the 
country (Shah, 2010, p. 95). 
In the States, malaria was first reported by Jamestown settlers in the early 1600s. It 
became the subject for preventative medicine as the first military hospital department arose in 
1775 and began developing germ theory (Ockenhouse, Magill, Smith, & Milhous, 2005, p. 12). 
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By the 1830s, when soldiers defending white settlers were engaged in fighting the Seminoles in 
Florida and experiencing exceptionally often fever, doctors were prescribing high doses of 
quinine (Ockenhouse, Magill, Smith, & Milhous, 2005, p. 12). During the Civil War, Union 
troops previously unexposed to malaria suffered from fever as they moved into southern regions, 
even delaying the seizure of Vicksburg, Mississippi for fear of anticipated high soldier mortality 
rates in the woods and swamps involved in traveling through the region. 
Although the U.S. had identified the cause of fever breakouts in the Civil War and 
southern states as a parasitic infection called malaria and begun environmental measures to 
eradicate it, the very eradication of the disease prevented immunity for travelers. As such, 
malaria in the 20th and 21st centuries has become a traveler’s threat. Nothing inherent about 
malaria is “African” or “Asian,” but the lack of it through large-scale capitalist and technical 
insecticide campaigns in western countries have made the disease appear as if it characterizes 
these global regions and thus their inhabitants. 
When the 1898 War with Spain, a country that was endemic at the time, led to deployed 
soldier camp outbreaks of uncertain disease, the U.S. Military established an investigatory board 
under the leadership of Major Walter Reed to inspect and research soldier disease. Some 
speculated that typhoid fever was the culprit, but the team determined that typhomalaria did not 
exist uniquely, and more importantly it established justification for microscopic testing of 
malaria back in the U.S. In 1900, Walter Reed investigated yellow fever in Cuba with Carlos 
Finlay under COL William Crawford Gorgas to determine the significance of mosquito 
transmission to preventative measures. In response, they quickly and successfully implemented a 
comprehensive plan to eradicate yellow fever in Cuba. However, as a much more complicated 
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disease, malarial parasites would be more difficult to fight. Insecticides, netting, and swatters 
helped American citizens fend off malaria until its Pacific involvement in World War I. 
Quinine remained the only malarial drug prescribed by western countries until the 1940s. 
Until the mid-20th Century, malaria was a concern of great exigence for western doctors and 
scientists, but it fell out of vogue once no longer endemic in the U.S. and Europe. At the same 
time, as the epoch of colonization slowed, so too did the concern for developing malaria 
prevention and treatment methods. 
Postcolonial and subaltern studies can help explain the nature of that health inequity that 
played a role in the necessity of WRAIR to take over the research side of developing mef-
Lariam; a project is typically reserved for researchers paid by the pharmaceutical company 
responsible for manufacturing a pill. Partly because of the Kefauver Harris Amendment of 1962, 
which required increased proof of efficacy for FDA approval, and party because there was little 
money to be made in developing a medicine for low-income countries, the only exigence for 
doing so came from the organization that needed to protect its members’ bodies from the foreign 
threat while in combat. In what Spivak (1988) refers to as “epistemic violence,” western 
biomedicine remains a tool for the rich. As a preventable disease, malaria most prominently 
plagues developing nations along the Equator, mirroring the habitats of the persistent HIV/AIDS 
endemic. Epistemic violence can help explain not only this phenomenon, but also the rhetorical 
exigence of an situation in which soldiers were at risk of failing to maintain their authority as 
physically strong and resilient-bodied Americans in the context of a war in which international 
politics dictated America’s need to help out a South Vietnamese population vulnerable not only 
to Communism but also disease 
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German microbiologists realized that synthetic dyes could be used as strains in the lab. 
Happenstance discoveries, in fact, are common in science; the popular school lesson of the 
“discovery” of penicillin— the result of petri dishes coincidentally left out to mold— is one such 
case. But these natural or “coincidental” occurrences need a hard lab bench to be legitimized in 
society. The move from observation of use of dye for staining to strategic repurposing of dye as 
cellular malaria treatment in the lab draws the border between nature and science. Although the 
synthetic dye was a biochemical manipulation, it was considered instrumental to a larger cause, 
much the same way that the cinchona bark was a common tree material until it became a means 
of fever prevention and ultimately a political bargaining tool.  
Those “happenstance” discoveries do not jive with the positivistic science in a vat model, 
so they are immediately transported to the lab to begin the process of instrumentalization, which 
requires not only measurement and observational data sets but also a place within the 
sociopolitical landscape. Institutional exigence determines the transferability of soft science into 
hard fact. The desire, in the growing free market economy, to develop commercial 
pharmacology, paired with the political power of antimalarials in war time, allowed scientists to 
consider novel approaches to prevention and bring chance observations into the lab to be tested 
and Scienticized (black boxed). As Latour (1987) notes, “the paradox of the fact-builders is that 
they have simultaneously to increase the number of people taking part in the action- so that the 
claim spreads, and to decrease the number of people taking part in the action- so that the claim 
spreads as it is” (p. 207). The building of atebrine required just one fact maker’s observations of 
methylene blue but many persons confirming, passing along and building off of its synthetic 
derivatives to not only legitimize the fact but also to move Bayer — and Germany— to the top of 
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the list of up and coming malarial research giants, thus providing a basis for legitimizing their 
work in the future. 
Particularly effective on staining plasmodia, methylene blue successfully cured two 
malaria patients, making them the first subjects of synthetic drugs (Meshnick & Dobson, 2001, p. 
19). A popular dye company, Bayer became a leader in pharmaceutical manufacturing, and they 
developed plamoquine  and mepacrine (atabrine) in 1925 and 1932, respectively (Meshnick & 
Dobson, 2001, p. 19). In 1934, a Bayer scientist developed resochin, but deemed it too toxic for 
use and consequently synthesized its derivative, sontochin.  
Chloroquine. When the Japanese seized Java during World War II and effectively took 
over the global quinine supply, American, British, and Australian scientists collaborated to 
develop new synthetic drugs. They tested and judged toxic resochin, and continued to test 16,000 
other compounds.  
This failure to develop a drug based on its toxicity is common in biochemistry; however, 
the later distinction as the “resochin error” points to the balancing act that science is forced to 
play with risk. Without a “measure” for risk, best judgment suffices to determine what drugs are 
followed up with and which are put on the shelf. While mef-Lariam wound up being too toxic to 
release, resochin was not toxic enough to later convince policy makers that they should have 
abandoned the compound. A scientist might throw up their hands and claim “I can’t win with 
these people,” alluding to the companies and policy makers requesting a final material product 
ready for market. On the other hand, developing a model for risk assessment that considers 
publics, rather than policy makers, as its main audience could get risk makers to bring more 
voices into their network, assessing the implications of their science from multiple perspectives. 
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Upon capturing North Africa, where the French were doing clinical trials on sonotochin, 
the Allies rekindled their interest in resochin. Johann “Hans” Andersag took atabrine and 
replaced its acridine ring with a quinoline ring to develop “chloroquine” that did not discolor 
skin and eyes (Krafts, Hempelmann, & Skòrska-Stania, 2012, p. 3). The drug went on to become 
the leading antimalarial worldwide (Meshnick & Dobson, 2001, p. 20). At the time of discovery, 
Andersag made a salt from the compound and called it “resochin,” but its toxicity shelved it at 
Bayer for over 10 years, which was considered a major mistake (Krafts Hempelmann, & 
Skórska-Stania, 2012, p. 4). Eventually a form of chloroquine was put in cooking salt and 
heralded by the WHO in the 1950s and 60s.  
Chloroquine rose quickly to popularity. It was touted as a cheap miracle drug, taking over 
the role of aspirin in Africa, and doctors advised persons to take chloroquine at the onset of any 
degree of fever, even before a malaria diagnosis (Shah, 2010, p. 102). Unfortunately, its success 
was also its downfall. The WHO’s medicated salt program has been considered as a contributor 
to widespread chloroquine resistance. Unfortunately, by the mid-1960s, plasmodium falciparum 
(p. falciparum), the more serious of the two most common strains of malaria, had become 
resistant to widely used chloroquine treatments.  This kind of resistance was first observed in 
1957 in Thailand, then in 1959 along the Colombian-Venezuelan border and in 1978 in Kenya 
and Tanzania (Sheehy & Reba, 1967; Baird, 2004; Campbell, Collins, Chin, Teutsch, & Moss, 
1979; Croft, 2007, p. 170), but chloroquine was the best antimalarial American medicine had 
developed. 
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Chapter 1: Vietnam Era Research 
Topoi as Response to Fluid Rhetorical Situation  
The rhetorical situation in which any rhetor operates is contingent on a number of factors, 
least of which is exigence. Scholars Bitzer (1968) and Vatz (1974) argued whether rhetors enter 
into or create discursive situations, bringing attention to the term “exigence,” Consigny (1974) 
gets closer to the definition of exigence that is closest to what’s at play in the WRAIR Malaria 
Drug Discovery Program. By claiming that the antimony between Bitzer and Vatz stems from 
their incomplete consideration of rhetorical practices, Consigny makes the case for rhetoric to 
function as an art, with real constraints that can be overcome with the use of commonplaces.  
Exigence depends entirely on the interpretations of actions and discourse. For instance, 
from a dominant western biomedical vantage point, the word “malaria” invokes an enemy in the 
form of a rare and dangerous parasite. On the other hand, for some settled bantu tribes in sub-
Saharan Africa whose bodies had become immune to the parasite’s deadly hemozoin, the disease 
signified a weapon that protected them from migrant enemies. Viewing rhetoric as an art with 
certain constraints not only supports its role in medical interventions but also carves out a space 
for ethical considerations about said interventions. It also explains how seemingly indeterminant 
but fatal health situations are met with such an array of responses globally.  To respond to this 
fluid nature of the rhetorical situation in medicine, the U.S. FDA makes use of commonplaces, or 
topoi, in an attempt to create stasis among invested stakeholders throughout the drug 
development process, leaning on the terms “safety” and “efficacy.” 
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Developing Exigence in Practice 
On January 15, 1973, President Nixon announced plans for a ceasefire that would bring 
troops home from Vietnam to airport protests in a country divided on their involvement in the 
War. While the soldiers, many of them drafted, put themselves in immediate danger on the front 
lines, for most, their biggest risk came from a second war that Americans were fighting—the war 
on malaria. During the Vietnam War as well as every previous military engagement in endemic 
regions, more Americans died from malaria than from bullets (Irwin, 2012, p. 3). Given high 
mortality rates from the parasitic infection in the Southwest Pacific during World War II, 
military medics were strict about preventative care by the time troops deployed for Vietnam, and 
they required all deployed personnel to take chloroquine.  
As more soldiers fell ill to infection with p. falciparum malaria in Vietnam, Congress 
responded by reinstating a Malaria Drug Discovery Program the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research (WRAIR) in Bethesda, Maryland. U.S. Army Surgeon General George Sternberg 
founded WRAIR in 1893 as the Army Medical School, and its primary focus has been the 
development of preventative medicine for infectious disease (WRAIR, 2014). At this site, 
researchers would test nearly 3,000 compounds for potential new drugs between 1963 and 1976 
(Maugh, 1977). Exigence for reaction was formed from two principle events: the Vietnam War 
and the observation of chloroquine resistance. The logic underlying this reaction was the binary 
“develop a drug or die,” insisting that the best and in fact only response rested on the success of 
the program in unveiling a compound. The dominant biomedical assumption that disease is a 
biochemical problem and thus must be funded as so led to the funding of a multi-million dollar 
project whose product ultimately got taken off the market and blacklisted. The plasmodium 
parasite has been creating a rhetorical exigence probably since before humans roamed the planet, 
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but the artful use of war and heroism tropes angled the situation so that the exigence could only 
be met with one rhetorical response. In other words, by framing the situation as a biomedical risk 
emergency, the funding of a large-scale, high-speed biomedical research project was perfectly 
fitting.  
Carolyn Miller (1992) frames this as the “centrality of kairos to the rhetoric of science” 
(p. 310). As she points out, timing and opportunity play essential roles in our understanding of 
scientific discourse as event whose appropriateness shifts. The DoD’s discursive decision to 
implement the Drug Discovery Program came at a kairotic moment of rhetorically created and 
sociopolitically motivated exigence. 
Promising Chemical: Medicinal Chemistry 1971 
Latour’s first chapter in Science in Action is entitled “literature,” in which he starts with 
the most basic, earliest start to the construction of a black box, “when someone utters a 
statement, what happens when the others believe it or don’t” (p. 21). In the case of mef-Lariam, 
an entire country of scientists, politicians, and military men were eager to believe promising 
leads in antimalarial discovery, so rather than extremist dissenters, domestically, mef-Lariam 
researchers had to deal with scientific yes-men. Collectively, readers of this early literature 
largely agreed on both the science and the foci of medicinal chemist reports, the first genre to 
document antimalarial compounds. On purpose of these texts was to establish a baseline for what 
the FDA would eventually use as terms of approval. As a compound, the literature needed to 
establish efficacy as grounds for moving forward with safety tests.  
During this initial discovery period, publications were written for an audience of 
discourse community members, all aware of the limitations of transferring “pure” biochemical 
science into applied drug manufacturing and prescription. The article’s writers, at this point, are 
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only concerned with the black boxes of chemistry. WRAIR test results show that their compound 
demonstrates antimalarial properties. They are not concerned with the history, funding, or 
controversial prison trials related to the WRAIR results. As inputs, these tests result in valuable 
outputs. 
The first publication to document mefloquine was a 1971 article supported by the Office 
of the Surgeon General of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command. The 
project started in chemistry discourse communities, presented at the Southeast Regional 
American Chemical Society Meeting and then published in the Journal of Medicinal Chemistry. 
Written by two postdocs and their PI at a University of Virginia lab, these scholars used results 
they obtained from WRAIR to present a study on the development of the 4-quinolone compound.  
The initial paragraph of this article opens with a reference to previous studies, mentioning 
that compounds in a series being pursued had “consistently shown only moderate or slight 
antimalarial activities again Plasmodium bergehi in mice, and they were also moderately 
phototoxic,” referencing a 1968 publication in the same journal (p. 926). The paragraph 
continues to elaborate on the development of the current research based on reconfiguring of 
elements in the 4-quinoline-methanol that demonstrated increased antimalarial success. The 
paragraph ends by justifying pursuit of this compound when it “proved to be curative at 20 
mg/kg and relatively nonphototoxic” (p. 926).  
The document’s first nod at “safety” comes in the integration of the root toxic. Because of 
the tendency of previous antimalarial agents and the general mechanisms of similar compounds 
to produce phototoxicity, this focus on skin reactions became the precedence for evaluating 
safety in the late 1960s and well into the 1970s. It’s also important to note that phototoxicity 
reports as well as proof of efficacy in this article (specifically in a footnote about the curative 
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levels) reference back to WRAIR studies. As the leaders in the charge to find an antimalarial, 
WRAIR science was the authority, and it furthered its voice in scientific communities when 
articles like this refer back to it. Latour (1987) writes that “attacking a paper heavy with 
footnotes means that the dissenter has to weaken each of the other papers” (p. 33), but in this 
case the weight of WRAIR papers is equivalent to countless smaller references. Because the 
global epidemic didn’t lend itself to profit and thus wasn’t well funded for university or 
pharmaceutical researchers, the Army had an ironic monopoly on malaria research in the States. 
Thus, dissenters within the medicinal chemistry discourse community would have a hard time 
attacking their results; the only mice studies funded in the nation. 
Following the paragraph introduction, explanatory paragraphs and chemical compound 
line drawings walk the reader through the process of chemical reduction to the resultant 
bis(trifluoromethyl)--(2-piperidyl)-4-quinolinemethanol that would become mef-Lariam. 
Midway through the article, after mentioning the most promising result that was prepared on a 
large scale, the researchers approach concerns of safety, writing, “Because of the suspicion 
formerly held that there might be a relation between phototoxicity and uv absorptivities, these 
values have been assembled in Table II” (p. 927). The article concludes with a section of highly 
technical language describing what is labeled as “experimental results” completed with 
apparatuses and a spectrograph. 
Uncertainty abounds in biochemical research; as a “pure” modern science, the field 
operates like a game of logic, and trial-and-error largely dictates results. The use of “might” here 
and modifiers throughout the article points to the uneasy but exciting steps that the UVA 
scientists took to get to their result; “addition of 2-PyrLi gave the pyridyl ketones 9a-9d, but only 
9a,b were obtained in good yields” (p. 926, with letter/number combinations pointing to 
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mathematic equations on the same page). This is reflective of the cooking allusion that Plato 
makes in the Gorgias, wherein he likens rhetoric to flattering cookery. What Plato’s modern 
divide fails to consider is how akin to cooking medicine actually is. In a review of clinical 
protocols in drug development, practitioners Bell and Walch and technical communication 
scholar Katz (2000) argue that while Plato dismisses rhetoric as deceitful, Aristotle’s 
introduction of the art into his “pharmacy” is more accurate for the process of drug development. 
In this early paper, formations are “reasonably interpreted,” and interpretations “may be 
significant.” Additionally, “it was feared [by the authors] that the PyrLi addition might be 
impeded by steric effects of the 5 substitute” and they muse that “possibly this overreduction was 
facilitated by the appreciable release of steric strain” (p. 927). The chemists constantly balance 
concerns about the unpredictability of steric effects (atomic spatial arrangement of chemical 
reactions) and make adjustments to their model, much like a chef would add a pinch of salt to 
temper sweetness or a baker might throw in baking soda to get their goods to rise in a second 
batch. Early biochemical papers in antimalarial research show simultaneous vulnerability and 
hopefulness. Over 300,000 compounds were synthesized and tested in the WRAIR campaign 
alone, and 2 emerged. Trepidation marked this program, and the writing that documents it show 
the finger crossing that chemists did with presumably every promising start. There was not one 
moment before the drug’s black box that declared, “this is it! We found our compound!” That 
came later, after the ready-made science was packaged. 
In terms of the equipment used to get to the black box, many rhetoricians of science have 
considered the effect of technology on not only science but on society as a whole, particularly 
post-WWII. By and large, the research that these UVA chemists present is only possible with the 
development of named equipment, which they reference in a footnote but is now more often 
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included in a methods section. In this study, the chemists treat equipment in much the same way 
they treat the WRAIR test results— as a given necessity whose material conditions are 
unquestioned. In reality, the equipment is another network imbued in sociopolitical constraints.4  
Human Trials: WHO Bulletin 1974 
After the publication of these findings, the WHO bulletin published the first human test 
results of mefloquine in a 1974 article by K. H. Rieckmann, Director of the Center for 
International Health at Rush University in Chicago; G. M. Trenholme and R.L. Williams former 
Majors of the Medical Corps at WRAIR; P.E. Carson, Chairman of the Department of 
Pharmacology at Rush University; H. Frischer, Director of Clinical Hematology and Red Cell 
Genetics Laboratories at Rush University; and R. E. Desjardins, Major in the Medical Corps at 
WRAIR. This interdisciplinary and cross-institutional group laid out a three-page description of 
their 17-person preliminary study in the Bulletin of the World Health Organization, a monthly 
peer-reviewed, open-access public health journal primary interested in developing countries.  
In the article, the team presents the problem with current chloroquine-resistant 
antimalarials as, at least partially, stemming from side effects and medication schedules:  
Protection of persons against falciparum malaria may be difficult in areas where 
chloroquine-resistant strains are common. Currently available drugs are often ineffective 
in preventing or suppressing malaria infections. Undesirable side-effects, the possible 
selection of resistant bacteria, and awkward medication schedules further limit the use 
and value of some drugs or drug combinations. During recent investigations with 
mefloquine (WR 142 490), we found that a single dose of the drug had a prolonged 
                                                 
4 For more on the discussion on the rhetoric of technology, see Miller (1998) and Winner (2010). 
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suppressive activity against a strain of P. Falciparum showing pronounced resistance to 
chloroquine and pyrimethamine. Preliminary results obtained with this 4-
quinolinemethanol compound are described in this report. (Trenholme, Williams, 
Desjardins, Frischer, Carson, Rieckmann, Canfield, 1975).  
As the only introductory paragraph in the piece, the piece begins, as most research 
projects do, with an introduction to the problem, identifying the justification for the new 
medicine. However, the results focus on the effectiveness of malaria prevention5, which, after 
many failed attempts, was a crucial first step. In early studies, the distinction between 
therapeutical and prophylactic capacities of was important; those that proved only capable of 
treating were thrown out of the pool early. Similarly, the research money that had gone into 
chloroquine only for plasmodia to outsmart it scared malariologists. To stay on top of the next 
wave of drug-resistant parasites, the newest drug would need to prove it could knock off the 
most recent violent offender. Otherwise, they feared, they would be facing a seemingly wasteful 
drug development project when a new strain came about in a few years, resistant to WRAIR’s 
pill.  
The results in this paper were very promising. First, the single volunteer exposed to 
malarial mosquitoes two days after taking mefloquine never developed parasitaemia, nor did the 
four volunteers bitten 14-16 days after drug administration. The article reports that in testing 
three individuals exposed to the parasite 21 days after taking mefloquine, “the drug suppressed 
parasitaemia in at least 2 and possibly all 3 of the individuals, but it did not prevent the 
                                                 
5 Annemarie Mol introduces the problem with conceptualizing illness as singular and segmented in The 
Body Multiple. In the case of mefloquine, side effects and medication schedules are mentioned in some contexts but 
sidelined in others. Considering a drug for its individual purposes, while serving individual stakeholder needs, opens 
gaps through which valuable connections can be lost and unseen. 
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development of patent infections” (p. 176). While the results demonstrated that the prepatent 
period with mefloquine extended to a mean of 29 days versus the mean of four control 
volunteers, which was at 10 days, the focus of the preliminary study was already moving towards 
establishing a half life. The experiment showed that the drug would work for 14-16 days, which 
was crucial as the daily doxycycline, an antibacterial FDA approved in 1969 that was beginning 
to show promise, posed many potential problems as a main malaria prophylaxis (Magill, 2013).  
The discussion section of this introductory public health article presents the background 
of developing this drug off the basis that a 4-quinolinemethanol showed potential in a previous 
study “conducted at our centre many years ago” (p. 376) but displaying “phototoxic side-effects” 
that prevented its further development. The authors explain that the funding of the program 
allowed further research in the 4-quinolinemethanol class, and explained that, in a study of one 
such compound, WR 30 090, “no appreciable phototoxicity or other side-effects were observed” 
(p. 376). By the fourth paragraph of the discussion section, the researchers get to the present 
study, claiming that the administration of mefloquine in nonimmune volunteers was “well 
tolerated” in single doses.  
Here again, the observation of phototoxicity in SN-10 275 is the focus of risk in 4-
quinolinemathanol compounds. Because of the nature of scientific experimentation, which relies 
either on innovation or further development of previous research, the continued focus on 
phototoxicity made sense, just as future foci on neurotoxicity will make sense following 
mefloquine’s fall. Impossible to predict all long-term drug complications, uncertain scientists 
rely on observational data from previous work. However, this can also blind observers to other 
side effects, especially when the precedence is set on a very visual display such as phototoxicity, 
manifesting in widespread red skin rashes. 
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The WHO Bulletin article concludes by stating that the studies “confirm the prolonged 
suppressive activity of mefloquine against infection with the Viet-Nam (Marks) strain of P. 
Falciparum” (p. 377), indicates a recommendation for a biweekly prophylactic dosage as well as 
further research on other strains, and for further research “to establish its cumulative toxicity, if 
any, during repeated administration.” The very last sentence of the article raises the concern of 
possible emergent strains of resistant malaria parasites. 
By the time this program was initiated, one of the biggest fears of malaria drug research 
was, and continues to be, the potential of the parasite to develop resistance to new drugs. The 
overuse of chloroquine and consequent widespread resistance meant that research was no longer 
just about inhibiting heme synthesis (and trying to do so before the parasite reached the liver 
stage) but rather about negotiating spending on development of new drugs to suit immediate 
needs and acknowledgment of long-term fears that those new drugs might lead to a cycle of drug 
evasion by the slippery parasite (and in the case of mefloquine, resistance by p. falciparum has 
been confirmed in southeast Asia, particularly on Thailand’s borders with Myanmar and 
Cambodia as well as southern Vietnam (Arguin, P.M. & Tan, K.T., 2013). The nonmodern 
reality of biomedical research is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in clinical trials, where 
researchers cross their fingers and hope that their theories materialize into viable solutions. In 
this setting is the closest human biomedical research can get to approaching claims of certainty; 
through observed responses and measurements, one can see a drug’s effect— if a patient doesn’t 
develop malaria, which can be evaluated through blood serum samples as well as observed 
physical symptoms— then it can be deemed effective.  
Measuring safety this way, however, is more problematic in that side effects beneath the 
surface, moving through neurons and into folds of the brain, go unseen and may not manifest for 
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years. If equipment is available for evaluation of particular toxicities, the researcher must know 
to test for it. In the case of early mefloquine testing, there was a great deal of trepidation 
concerning not only resistance but also toxicity. The potential for neurotoxicity was glossed over 
completely or tied in with general safety concerns. 
Discourse to a wide scientific audience about WR142,490 as an early and promising 
compound has begun to demonstrate the community’s underlying ethic of expedience, wherein 
the exigence for the drug is not promoted as a defense against a disease but rather as a material 
entity that will promote the WRAIR research program and the science that at this point it had 
invested eight years into developing. The tension underlying the push to produce a response and 
to validate the program’s worth was high, and it set the tone for how clinical trials and 
definitions of efficacy were being established.   
Experimental Drug: Pharmacology and Chemotherapy 1979 
By the time that the compound had become an experimental antimalarial drug, it had a 
number of voices in chemistry backing it. The WRAIR authors refer readers back to the studies 
that Latour (1987) says are “in reserve, ready to bring with them the many technical supports 
[the authors] need to make [their] point firm” (p. 36). The expert voices that these scientists use 
are benign and uncontested, but as with the original article by Lutz, Ohnmacht, and Patel (1971), 
they are uncertain at times, particularly about the steric effects of the synthesis process. It seems 
that by 1979, these concerns have been worked out. 
In 1979, mefloquine made it into the first section of Volume 16 of Advances in 
Pharmacology and Chemotherapy. Under the chapter “New Experimental Antimalarial Drugs,” 
written by Robert. S. Rozman and Craig J. Canfield, both of the WRAIR Division of 
Experimental Therapeutics, this section includes drug-specific subsections on 
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quinolinemethanols, phenanthrenemethanols, quinazolines, and drugs entering efficacy trials. 
WR 142,490 is the second of two in the quinolinemethanols description and detailed in 6 pages 
of the print journal. By this time, the drug had received its name “mefloquine” and the compound 
had been further studied, isolated, and characterized in Journal of Medicinal Chemistry articles. 
A method of quantifying the drug in blood was also reported in a 1977 pharmaceutical 
journal paper, and it was subsequently tested in mouse and monkey models with Malaysian and 
Vietnamese P. falciparum strains as well as New Guinea and Vietnamese P. Vivax strains. Test 
results focused on curative abilities at various amounts (2.5-5.0mg/kg) given orally and rate of 
administration (once, 3, and 7 days). Another focus was on comparison between strains, 
particularly chloroquine-resistant and chloroquine-sensitive strains. The “preclinical efficacy and 
biology” section continues to outline the methods for developing chloroquine-resistant p. 
Berghei and concludes with a paragraph on the intercalation mechanism of antimalarials with 
DNA, stating that “mefloquine has been shown not to bind significantly to DNA” (p. 13).  
One primary concern about efficacy that emerges here focuses on the variable of p. 
falciparum strains. Because there are infinite numbers of malaria strains and their derivatives, a 
significant challenge for malariologists has been keeping up. Research results are always limited 
to the strains to which scientists subject their testing models. While researchers can be fairly 
confident that results will transfer for similar strains from close geographic areas, resistance is 
common and unpredictable, so the move from lab to use in endemic areas is always 
unpredictable and based on a certain degree of uncertainty. The strains themselves are often 
named after areas from which they come, furthering the stigma of places in which malaria is a 
threat to local populations. Discursively associating a disease strain with the name of a country is 
a transparent and easy nomenclature system but it brings with it the burden of Othering. Here, 
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the naming serves as a means of defining efficacy within this discourse community, and the 
definition has no apparent connection to patient consumption but rather focuses on parasitic 
reaction. Although the drug is in clinical testing phases, internal biological functions of human 
body+protozoa have agency over the definition of efficacy, and quasi-objects like 
perception+compliance are left out. This isn’t a surprising move, logically, but it helps to define 
how the ethics of efficacy are winning out over the ethics of patient safety without overtly 
denying “safety” from considerations.  
In fact, safety was clearly brought forward as a secondary concern. After the chemistry 
and efficacy section, content under the heading “preclinical toxicology” outlines results in 
animal models of rats and beagle dogs under varying amounts of daily drug dosages. At high 
levels (150 mg/kg/day), death occurred in both species. Toxicity reports at lower levels indicated 
lymphocytopenia “with no other adverse effects” in the rat and “ocassional diarrhea and emesis, 
and depletion in lymphoid tissues and/or inflammatory changes in the liver characterized by 
vacuolar degeneration” (p. 13) in the dog. The article also reports on studies that tested animal 
models for 52 consecutive weeks and found minimal issues. Lastly, it looks at varying levels in 
pregnant female rats and males for fertility, finding that at 100mg/kg/day, mefloquine “produced 
some anomalies” (p. 14) that didn’t occur at dosages of 10mg/kg/day. One sentence concludes 
the section to indicate that no phototoxicity was found in mice given mefloquine.  
As compared to the first publication, in which phototoxicity was given significant 
attention, the authors here have moved on to focusing on other side effects, constructing an 
updated definition of safety that revolved around dosages. For the pharmacology community, it 
is with dosages that ideas about safety and efficacy merge. Adverse effects (“safety”) are 
described according to administration amounts and frequencies (“efficacy”) so as to reach an 
 38 
 
agreeable dosage that is both safe and effective. Of course, variants of adverse effects aren’t 
overtly measured in the same scale, nor do the authors discuss causation for effects in the 
gastrointestinal and central nervous systems, instead treating them as inevitable but tamable 
byproducts of the compound. 
The final section of the article on “clinical studies” references Phase I human trials by 
Trenholme et.al. (1975) and Clyde et.al. (1976). In the first, the authors note, “transient dizziness 
and nausea were reported for 4 out of 8 volunteers receiving [single doses of] either 1750 or 
2000 mg” (p. 15), but there were no signs of phototoxicity. In the second, weekly doses of 250 
and 500 mg over eight weeks produced no side effects, as were doses of 500 mg every two 
weeks for six to eight weeks. Meanwhile, monthly doses of 100 mg for two or three months 
produced “mild epigastric discomfort but no vomiting or diarrhea after each dose” (p. 15). The 
authors mention a 1-year tolerance study wherein they reference personal communication but no 
significant information about methods other than weekly doses is given.  
In this paper appear reports from across the field and across time. At this point, the 
concern over gastrointestinal problems is response to those presented in the dog model. The fact 
that no adverse effects are observed is constructed from the lack of previously observed or 
measured results. As the biochemical model moves into the category of experimental 
chemotherapy, mef-Lariam’s side effects become more and more factish, with declarative 
language and more citations. Here, toxicity has moved away from just observed skin rashes and 
nausea and on to more quantitative measures like BUN levels. The first mention of dizziness 
appears, once, at the time that the drug moves closer to material development and regulatory 
phases, where stakes are higher and more names are on the line if the drug were to carry with it 
significant issues. At the time of this publication, the WRAIR drug discovery program is no 
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longer active, and the promise of its compound 142,490 is beginning to gain significant steam, 
having appeared in over 200 peer-reviewed articles. While there was an ethical responsibility to 
be very transparent in addressing previous concerns in the community, there was little apparent 
impetus to seek out concerns outside of those, which would include neurotoxicity. 
Rozman and Canfield refer back to Trenholme’s work in 1975 to present Phase II 
(human) clinical trials. In two paragraphs, the writers summarize successful findings from the 
original source. The authors then claim that “the radical curative activity of mefloquine was 
confirmed in a field trial in Thailand with patients who had naturally acquired falciparum 
malaria,” citing a different 1976 study. The article ends by stating that the drug was “well 
tolerated orally in doses up through 1500 mg for 1 day or in 500 mg weekly doses for 52 weeks” 
(p. 17).  
This move to field acquisition and trials is crucial to revealing the diverse experience of 
malarial acquisition; however, it’s a much different test than a study on nonimmune inmate 
volunteers in a controlled environment. Rather than confirming lab results, it provides additional 
and different results. Nevertheless, it becomes more difficult to refute the curative efficacy of the 
drug as different environments and tests are added to the list of potential references to cite and 
present to broader and broader audiences. While the number of participants and methods of 
monitoring them are not necessarily expanding, the kinds of studies and number of researchers 
involved are increasing. By this point at which the drug is still experimental but Phase II clinical 
trials have been undergone, it’s at the point in which Phase III clinical trials would begin. The 
efficacy of curing parasitemia has been demonstrated on mouse, dog, monkey, and inmate 
volunteers at various dosages, and the drug has been deemed safe according to all the criteria that 
researchers knew to look for— phototoxicity and naseua. This report is positive throughout. 
 40 
 
Conclusions refer back to the study previously reported in the same article, but they 
remove the citation, moving the small-scale field study out of its questionable context and into 
the realm of fact. Still, the use of simple past tense implies that the finding is the result of one or 
many studies and not a recurring phenomenon (simple present) or even a sure occurrence that 
can be anticipated in the future (future). 
Quinolinemethanols are just one of three classes of compounds presented in the 
antimalarials chapter of the journal. Between the three, mefloquine is one of eight WRAIR 
compounds, included two that were classified as having entered efficacy trials. In both of these 
early-stage compounds, very small scale clinical trials (N=13-45) documented lack of 
phototoxicity and nervous system side effects like “an increase in vivid dreams” (p. 35) and 
“some mild mental ‘fuzziness’” (p. 37). These findings come in the first of seven chapters in the 
journal, followed by chapters dedicated to anxiety therapies, anestheics, antitumor agents, and 
anticancer activity by colleagues from WRAIR as well as places like childrens hospitals, cancer 
institutes, and even a department of veterinary pathology at the University of Sydney in 
Australia, among many other international institutions. The advisory and editorial boards are 
similarly diverse, with members of both residing across Europe and the States and working in 
academic, private research institute, and hospital settings.  
The implied audience, thus, is a diverse one of early-stage experimental researchers. 
Introductory explanations suggest that chemists and pharmacologists readers work at the cutting 
edge of compound discovery rather than within a particular applied subject such as malarial 
research. This construction of audience provides an example of how the divide between pure and 
applied science is made. Contributions to this volume are considered meant to inform about what 
is happening at the level of innovation; those working in applied sciences are to interpret and do 
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something with the facts that these early purists provide. Of course, those focused on 
antimalarials at these early levels would be able to allude to findings of toxicity and nervous 
system side effects from other trial drugs, but isolating one compound as the most promising to 
present to a regulatory audience erases concerns from similar trials.  
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Chapter 2: NDA Research Findings 
The FDA’s New Drug Application (NDA) is the genre where medicinal chemistry and 
pharmacological researchers aspire to persuade readers to believe in the safety and efficacy of 
their product. In this space, pharmaceutical companies enter into a conversation with other expert 
communities not for the purpose of developing their science but rather of developing regulations 
for public consumption. The NDA is the technical sales pitch, where drug developers put forth 
their best research. Here, discovery has ended, as far as the hopeful rhetor is concerned.  
After Phase I and II clinical trials by WRAIR, the Army partnered up with Swiss 
pharmaceutical company Hoffman-La Roche to market WR 194,490, which the company named 
Lariam. Unfortunately, the details of this partnership are not public (Croft, 2007). In 1985, a 
review of recent chemotherapy and vaccination trends published in the British Medical Journal 
name Lariam as a “highly effective compound” discovered ten years prior and “synthesised and 
tested by a pharmaceutical company, and clinically assess in Brazil, Thailand, Zambia, and other 
countries” and already being distributed (Bruce-Chwatt, 1985, p. 1073). By 1986, there was 
concern over mefloquine resistance in Thailand Indonesia (Irian Jaya), but the drug was 
considered promising nonetheless, with no serious side effects reported in 800-person global 
trials reported by WHO (Hoffman, 1986, p. 194). This same article would report that 14.7% of 
these 800 trial participants experienced “dizziness” and 0.9% reported neuropsychiatric changes. 
In 1986, the drug was only commercially available to Switzerland (Hoffman, 1986, p. 195). 
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Lariam6 would not officially marketed and distributed to U.S. troops for three years, and U.S. 
dosages would be slightly different from those of European pills because of the FDA’s pressure 
on Roche to revisit their dosing regimens.   
Still, successful integration of the drug to the Swiss, a so-called first-world market, 
provided a model for global use and might have proven the exigence to continue distribution on a 
wider scale. It also meant that American public health stakeholders would be eager to begin 
using the drug themselves so as to stop subjecting nonimmune American travelers to risk of 
malaria armed only with outdated drugs. The use on the global market meant that the project was 
too far along to go back, for if Swiss travelers were using the product of American research, then 
why would U.S. regulation delay our own use? 
The structure of the NDA reveals the priorities of the FDA audience and the degree to 
which the applicant can mask uncertainties in the process of presenting findings that the agency 
seeks and values. Similar to the accepted understanding that newspapers prioritize issues that 
they anticipate their readership to be most interested in and bury those stories that may have 
broad international implications but are unlikely to attract local readers, the NDA touches on the 
most pertinent concerns of its readers first. In this case, a narrow focus maintains the argument 
that mefloquine has the ability to inhibit parasites in red blood cells and it calls attention to what 
would have been a malarial expert’s interest in the compound’s ability to inhibit these parasites 
outside of the red blood cells (i.e. in the liver). 
                                                 
6 The drug was being used in Thailand for clinical drug testing, a typical colonial move by pharmaceutical 
companies that export clinical trials hosted in western countries to economically underprivileged countries for 
experimentation on human subjects. 
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Safety and Efficacy 
Hoffman-La Roche first submitted “Lariam” for FDA approval on February 19, 1986 and 
made amendments to the document in 1987, thrice in 1988, and once in February 1989 before its 
approval for licensure on May 2, 1989. In a letter from then director of the Office of Drug 
Evaluation James M. Bilstad to then La Roche Drug Regulatory Affairs Jeannie-Marie Skinner, 
the FDA requested supplemental copies of final printed labeling, which was approved in its draft 
stage but apparently still undergoing adjustments on La Roche’s end. Additionally, the FDA 
asked for advertising copy for the agency’s records as required by law. In this letter, Bilstad 
acknowledges that “adequate information has been presented to demonstrate that the drug is safe 
and effective for use as recommended in the draft labeling… Accordingly, the application is 
approved” (FDA, 1989, p.1).   
The labels, according to this sentiment, serve the purpose of recommending usage. This 
regulatory purpose is overlooked when the labels become the primary communication about 
safety for prophylactic patients, who unlike pain patients do not question the efficacy of 
recommended dosages but might look to the label for information on safety and side effects, 
which would affect not the efficacy of the drug (its ability to do its job) but its effectiveness (its 
ability to work in context, along with factors like perception and compliance).  
As a successful NDA, at minimum, the mef-Lariam application passes FDA standards. At 
maximum, it might serve as a model for future drugs. The structure of the document itself is not 
particularly surprising as far as technical reports go. The focus for the first 14 pages explains the 
findings of ten clinical trials worldwide. They are not inherently persuasive in the way that grant 
proposals are framed, with justifications, implications, methods and specifications and instead 
blow up the findings— they answer: what does the drug do and what are its limitations? Each 
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study briefly lays out the title, dosage, summary of methods and results, followed by a comment 
section of what Roche sponsors understand from the findings.  
The mefloquine NDA contains 16 pages of medical officer’s review at its core, with 
much more supplementary information that accompanies it. After an initial letter from the FDA 
to Roche, the medical officer’s review begins with brief identifying information then presents a 
page and a half on recommended dosages for treatment/prophylaxis, indications for use, and 
manufacturing and controls, before reporting on parasitology, toxicology, and pharmacology 
findings in prophylaxis and treatment studies. Ultimately, the medical officer approves the drug 
but with some reservations. 
The strategy, here, is to divide and explain. With so much content and so many 
orientations, it seems that the institutional field has decided to frame risk as one category of 
consideration alongside efficiency and usage. This classification, while speaking to experts of 
each separation, fails to communicate a unified subject with multiple lines of flight. Instead, it 
relies on dividing expertise to the point that they exist side-by-side but fail to communicate with 
one another. 
That’s not to say that this categorization and focus on multiple experts is not warranted— 
the pharmaceutical and regulatory structures are too complicated for one to be expert of all 
things. However, at some point, there needs to be oversight of all of these components together.  
A master rhetor that can put the various parts together as a whole to present to one regulatory 
committee would move from an idealized image of a drug as having multiple effects to a more 
realistic image of a drug as being multiple.  
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Dosages 
The opening section of the mefloquine NDA presents parasitologic findings associated 
with the compound. Resistance to the primary strains of malaria is documented using p. berghei, 
or the equivalent of p. falciparum developed for use in mice experimentation.7 In each section, 
findings refer to this p. bergehi, which is an accepted variable for this kind of research. 
Of course, the documents serve an incredibly rhetorical purpose. They request approval. 
Rather than asking the audience to put their money in the form of physical cash on the line, they 
ask for regulatory capital, for the FDA to put its credibility on the line. At their roots, grant and 
new drug applications are similar requests and often cater to similar organizational audiences. 
While the toxicology section serves to present adverse effects, the entire document 
contains places in which things could go off the rails. Toxicology is the significant risk here, but 
the NDA fails to present comprehensive sections laying out the corporal effects of the drug, 
much like the significance and background sections of the grant genre. It might be implied that 
expert readers will understand the contexts of the clinical trials and the justification for applying 
for the drug’s licensure despite apparent central nervous system effects like dizziness, but 
dedicating a section of the NDA for this role would clear up the findings to secure stasis around 
the terms on which drug approval hinges.  
On pages 15-16, a table and handful of paragraphs lay out the findings of adverse effects. 
Under prophylaxis (as opposed to treatment), researchers compile the results of 114 total 
                                                 
7 Monika Cwiarka (2011) calls attention to the linguistic functions of reification and phenomenological 
functions that neurobehavioral scientists use when communicating results based on lab mice. She questions the very 
practice of conflating animal and human reactions in behavioral studies. Here, WRAIR researchers use mice to 
determine protozoan inhibition but also consider side effects based on this model, which might be helpful in 
exploratory observations but certainly cannot fully predict human reactions.  
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volunteer reactions and include syncope, nausea, vomiting, extrasystoles, and dizziness, 
reporting that between 0 and 3 of 114 suffered from the first 4, and, under “dizziness,” using just 
a question mark with the footnote “the numbers are unknown. The sponsors stated only 
‘several’” (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: NDA summary of adverse effects, p. 15 
 
The treatment section, B, tested a total of 469 volunteers, of which 21% experienced 
dizziness. Under said section a note indicates that “some of these symptoms are part of the 
disease process, it is therefore difficult to say exactly what is drug induced. This 
notwithstanding, the high rate of dizziness reported deserves evaluation” (p. 15). 
The “final comments” section starts immediately with major concerns on part of the 
author, medical officer Celia J. Maxwell, M.D. She notes that the drug was compared against 
itself rather than against current treatment and that the prominence of dizziness in high dosages 
is a major concern. In the correspondence between the medical officer at the FDA and the drug 
regulatory affairs manager at Roche, the FDA has some confusion about the implications of 
reported adverse effects that are overlooked in its approval. Given that this was the only 
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compound that the decade-long WRAIR program produced as a safe and effective possibility, 
and that there weren’t extensive reports of side effects (which may have indicated that the side 
effects were idiosyncratic or the result of the malaria disease itself), agency seems to exist, at the 
moment of licensure, in sociopolitical exigence to get the drug to market. 
The chief concerns for new drug licensure hinge on demonstration of “safety” and 
“efficacy.” Opening language that deems the drug “safe and effective” mirrors that of the 
Kefauver Harris Amendment of 1962, which required more stringent measures to prove safety 
and efficacy of drugs on the heels of the “thalidomide tragedy” in which thousands of babies 
were born with birth defects or stillborn because of loose clinical trial terms that resulted in the 
distribution of over 20,000 nausea tablets with incredibly high dosages (Kim & Scialli, 2011).  
The amendment established new regulations for proving that consumer drugs were safe 
and effective before going to market. While this amendment is credited with lowering the 
numbers of hokey drugs (Kim & Scialli, 2011), it also meant that pharmaceutical companies 
became picky about choosing which conditions to take on because of the additional costs that the 
measures would require. Some have criticized the amendment for being a knee-jerk 
Congressional response to a medical disaster (see Krantz, 1966, which claimed that the 
amendment “had its origin in the hysteria and panic of the thalidomide tragedy, it was nurtured 
and developed in the pandemonium of the biased hearings before the Kefauver Committee of the 
Senate, and through the pressure of an impetuous Administration, was enacted into law” (p. 78)). 
By and large, though, the resultant checks on drugs have been celebrated as a victory for 
consumer safety advocates. 
Kefauver-Harris amendments centered on particular definitions of “safe” and “effective.” 
Cicero’s stasis theory might bring forward the crux of arguments for safety and efficacy; by 
 49 
 
questioning these definitions, one can bring forward the assumptions about safety. In the case of 
mef-Lariam, safety didn’t consider neurotoxicity. 
Attached to these 15 pages are four chemist reviews from 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 
completed by the Division of Anti-Infective Drug Products. Each review was no more than two 
pages and similar in format. The first two reviews were completed by John W. Taylor, Ph.D. 
while the latter two were both completed by Wilson H. De Camp, PhD. Each follows genre 
conventions of introducing the drug and dosage recommendations then making reviewer remarks 
and conclusions. In 1986, Dr. Taylor remarked that “apparently about 1981, Roche discovered 
that the drug exists in 5 polymorphic modifications and revised the granulation process to 
generate a more bioavailable product containing the polymorphic ‘E’ crystalline drug,” alluding, 
presumably, to the FDA medical officer’s criticism that most clinical trials were with a different 
formulation of the mefloquine chloride compound than was later presented. The bioavailability 
that Taylor mentions might also refer to the funding that Roche received to make a more 
affordable drug as a result of the 1983 Orphan Drug Act, which provided incentives for 
companies willing to invest in rare or “orphaned” disease, of which malaria was included 
(Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, 2010) Taylor’s conclusion in this first review is that “the application 
is non-approvable per 505(b)(1)(d) of the Act.” According to the FDA (2014), section 
505(b)(1)(d) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act corresponds to “a full description of 
the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and 
packing of such drug.”  
Remarking that the requisite responses were sufficient but that dosages differing from the 
proposed and those in use in France and Switzerland needed to be explained and accounted for 
on labeling, Taylor writes that the “application is approvable from the standpoint of manufacture 
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and control” in the second chemist’s review. He also provides language to be inserted in a letter 
to Roche requesting additional Army research information. The third chemist’s review is a reply 
to the second, referring to the application’s approval “from a manufacturing and controls 
standpoint” but indicating in the conclusions section that “labeling remains NOT 
APPROVABLE” (emphasis original).  
The final chemist’s review is what translated to the final letter of the drug’s approval. 
Here, De Camp agrees to approve “all items except Labeling,” writing that telephone 
conversations communicated the necessary changes. Amidst known dosing issues that would 
prevent effectiveness and compliance and announced trepidation over what might be going on in 
the drug’s interaction with the central nervous system, mef-Lariam was approved and marketed 
to the public.  
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Discussion 
Rhetoric of Pharmaceutical Compliance  
The FDA’s New Drug Application (NDA) consists not only of lab and clinical results but 
also of the consumer label, which also necessitates approval for commercial use. Through 
journal articles and scientific discourse, medicinal chemistry and chemotherapy researchers, 
from those in the WRAIR lab paid by the U.S. Army to those in the field paid by Roche, agree 
that there is at least some degree of uncertainty about the effects of mef-Lariam for prophylactic 
use on a large-scale nonimmune human population. How does that uncertain risk get 
communicated outside of scientific discourse communities? Under the intention of providing 
information for, by default, a health illiterate public audience, writers scrape off the layers of risk 
and uncertainty to get to and deliver a prognosis: if you are in x situation, you should do y. 
In this work, the public becomes defined as anyone outside of the core stakeholder group 
formed around a particular task, and that public conflates a Fulbright poet fellow traveling to 
India with a local Army medic who has lived in Viet Nam and treated malaria all her life. Mef-
Lariam’s uncertainty was accepted among Roche, WRAIR, and FDA stakeholders but never 
translated to prescribing physicians much less patients. Given “Army culture” of silencing 
soldiers in the face of hierarchical rank systems, soldiers were encouraged to take what they were 
given and not speak up about side effects. Consequently, patient fear resulted in noncompliance. 
It is important for technical communication scholars, particularly those interested in the 
communication of health and health risks to publics, to note where this translation work happens.  
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Immediately after the FDA approved licensure of Lariam, it began getting distributed to 
international travelers. The audience for information communication about the drug transitioned 
from the FDA to lay consumers. Following medical packaging protocols, Hoffman La Roche 
distributed pamphlets of information along with the drug. Intended to inform patients of side 
effects and drug usage, the pamphlets are important texts for understanding medical composition 
and communication. In fact, these labels would become the source of blame in what would 
become referred to as a scandal.  
Roche Labels and Medication Guide 
Label as Afterthought.  Mef-Lariam was approved for licensure on the basis of its 
reviews of safety and efficacy, and although public communication was a necessary component 
of the regulation process, the labels had no bearing on the company’s ability to get the drug 
approved. In correspondence by FDA officers to Roche, the FDA indicated that additional labels 
were needed “for administrative purposes” for the then-approved drug (see Error! Reference 
ource not found.). In other words, the focus of the NDA and a drug’s ability to get passed, on 
this case, relied on the intercommunication between expert communities and not on the 
communication between these expert communities and patient publics. In fact, the drug is well 
documented as receiving FDA licensure in 1989, but the labels following up on this request were 
not received until 2 January, 1990. 
  
Figure 4: (left) FDA label request in NDA response, 2 May 1989 (right) Roche response to request, 2 January 1990 
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 The divided nature of this process, in which some parts are examined by certain experts 
and others are looked at separately and as auxiliary demonstrates not only regulatory perception 
of medicine but also that of the public.  Nonmodern scientists are okay with uncertainty for the 
purpose of discovery within their own discourse communities, but 
translating scientific efficacy as effectiveness to a regulatory audience 
prohibits poor clinical research from accurately and ethically 
communicating patient risk to publics.    
Drug Packaging. The design of pharmaceutical packaging itself 
questions rhetor’s intentions and audience expectations. As the product 
of a commercial endeavor, the label reflects a brand’s economic goal of 
consumption. As a regulatory document intended to prevent lawsuits, its 
style resembles that of any user agreement; that is, it’s not read in depth 
by casual users.  
Nevertheless, the mef-Lariam insert provides valuable insight into 
Roche’s construction of modern science. At the moment in which the 
writers move from addressing an audience of fellow scientists in the 
NDA to that of which they are addressing non-scientist audiences, 
dizziness from unknown but concern-worthy causes become “adverse 
effects” and correlations between mental health patient demographics 
and reports become warnings of causal drug interactions for select 
populations.  
FDA medical officer Dr. Celia Maxwell’s initial concerns 
expressed in the NDA that the presented studies were problematic because “’mefloquine was 
Figure 5: First approved 
Lariam label, 1989 
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compared to mefloquine’ for efficacy as opposed to the current standard of treatment” is 
reflected in the insert line under contraindications that reads, “use of this drug is contraindicated 
in patients with a known hypersensitivity to mefloquine or related compounds.” The hesitancy 
about the reliability of the original data is translated into a guideline, but passive voice prevents 
the reader from access to the causality for the contraindication referenced. Furthermore, Roche 
covers its bases regarding the FDA’s concern without providing any guidance for lay or expert 
readers. Because mefloquine is a 4-quinolinemethanol, a much different compound than other 
antimalarials that were currently on the market, it would be unlikely for consumers to know their 
sensitivity to it or to similar drug compounds. So, while Roche covers lab uncertainty, it fails to 
communicate the uncertainty itself to its public audience, indicating that its primary audience is 
the small group of FDA stakeholders to whom they are responding. 
Dr. Nevin Remington, MD, MPH, a former Army epidemiologist and Preventive 
Medicine officer, writes, “From my perspective, the original warning of encephalopathy, and 
certain symptoms being ‘prodromal’ to a more serious event, suggests to me that the sponsors 
were fully aware of the drug’s neurotoxicity from the time of the drug’s initial licensing” 
(personal communication). The word “prodromal” appears in the precautions section, which 
continues in the push/pull manner of audience analysis and response, although it seems to allude 
more overtly to neurologic concerns, possibly responding to the “dizziness” conversation held 
during the licensure process. Particularly fascinating is the fact that the drug was developed by 
Army researchers and deemed one of two best options coming out of a military funded program 
for the purpose of use in deployments, yet the first warning the insert advises against operating 
heavy machinery (albeit buried three quarters into the document) (see Figure 6). In this section, 
the conflict that authors have between the lived reality of nonmodern science and the understood 
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expectation of Scientific certainty becomes clear. Authors collapse the divide between 
prophylaxis and treatment uses when reporting findings, failing to distinguish which of the two 
“have been reported during the use of Lariam,” and thus getting around the field report that 
researchers had only indicated “several” cases of dizziness. In the following sentence, however, 
they specify that for prophylactic use, neuropsychiatric side effects “may be considered 
prodromal to a more serious event.” 
 
Figure 6: Precautions section of 1990 Lariam insert 
In his memoir about his experience with Lariam that led to crippling amnesia, former 
Fulbright scholar in India David MacLean pieces together stories from his mother and colleagues 
about minor episodes in which he had acted uncharacteristically angry, had uncontrollable 
vomiting, and even once inexplicably blacked out while on mef-Lariam. After a series amnesiac 
event, he returns to the States and in his local physician’s office, the doctor reported that, “these 
events all seemed to be prodromal to the larger episode.” MacLean continues, “I had him define 
prodromal for me: ripples before the tsunami” (p. 101).  Later in the memoir, MacLean would 
write about his fear that the serious event could be “prodromal” to an even more serious one. 
Although the term rests on a degree of comparison, syntactically, it does not provide a 
superlative in terms of degree or temporality. There is no teleological conclusion to the “serious 
events” here, and the term, albeit helpful as a pre-consumption warning, becomes useless for 
post-affected users or their advocates.  
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MacLean’s work also provides insight into the other term in the precautions that Nevin 
points out: encephalitis. Mef-Lariam’s interaction with the brain is complicated because, as the 
early journals demonstrate, it can be difficult to observe and measure, especially if one is not 
looking for it. Bioengineers have been particularly interested in the role of the blood-brain 
barrier (BBB) for targeting drug delivery for a number of syndromes, particularly those 
infections like meningitis that are able to cross the incredibly robust BBB. As a traditionally 
impermeable defense system, his cell canal instils awe and fear among scientists who want to 
manipulate it for good while aware of its high sensitivity. MacLean explains his understanding of 
Lariam as “very good at crossing the blood-brain barrier” (p. 143). He elaborates on the ability of 
Lariam to become neurotoxic as it “pools in the brain” (p. 143) because of its interference with 
protein gap junctions, a theory that has emerged recently, over twenty years after the drug went 
to market. According to his research and experience: 
Scientists type these junctions by their size, and Lariam affects two very specifically 
sized ones. One is found in the areas that process information from the eyes, and the other 
is in the vestibular system, the system that processes all the data from your senses and 
establishes your balance and body’s response to them. Lariam can nestle into these 
protein gap junctions and scatter the data that passes through them, like putting your 
thumb over a hose’s spray. (p. 143) 
Of course, as he acknowledges, this hypothesis about mef-Lariam is extremely difficult to 
prove because of the nature of studying the brain—a patient would have to be dead to analyze 
the drug’s role. Of course, none of this is communicated to the patient in the original insert, and 
the product labels become the source of blame and rectification for miscommunication about the 
neurotoxic effects of the drug. In other words, when stakeholders could not communicate the 
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nonmodern science of uncertainty, it was the communication i.e. the documentation itself that 
inherited that shortcoming, protecting the real culprit of faulty Science.  
Post-Marketing Communication 
Public Definition of Safety.  Once mef-Lariam was prematurely put to market, military 
rhetorics allowed the rouse to continue for some time. Ultimately, media coverage, relying on 
consumer reports and highly public incidences removed the toxic prophylaxis drug from the 
shelves, although mefloquine chloride is still administered under its generic name. Although lab 
biochemists define terms by instrumental means, the public consumer defined those same terms 
through narrative. Only needing the evidence of their own experiences, public patients began 
deeming the drug unsafe. As a result, compliance decreased significantly. In fact, one study 
found that 61% of soldiers prescribed daily doxycycline were compliant with their regimen 
whereas only 38% of service members on weekly regimens were compliant in Afghanistan, 
where there were 58 cases of malaria among military service members in 2010. Furthermore, 
20% of those surveyed did not receive medication information from a healthcare professional 
(Brisson & Brisson, 2012; Nevin, 2012). An unconsumed prophylactic drug is completely 
ineffective in preventing malaria. Thus, the public’s definition of effective hinges on the public’s 
perception of its safety, not on clinical findings centered on malaria prevention.  
FDA Response.  The FDA, nevertheless, responded to reports of neuropsychiatric events 
associated with mef –Lariam by adding warnings to public communication strategies. In a 
British study of 1214 travelers taking mefloquine between 1993 and 1995, 333 reported 
neuropsychiatic adverse effects (Barrett, Emmins, Bradley & Clarke, 1996). This study used self-
reporting questionnaires. In 2001, results of the first double-blind study of the drugs Malarone 
and Lariam in the Netherlands reported that new drugs were needed, as 67% of patients 
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experienced adverse effects when taking Lariam (Overbosch, et. al., 2001). This led to numerous 
studies that all reported varying degrees of neurological concerns for non-immune takers of 
Lariam (Potasman, Juven, Weller, Schwartz, 2002; Sclagenhauf, et. al, 2003; for a 
comprehensive literature review on mef-Lariam neuropsychiatric side effects see Toovey, 2009). 
As these reports were surfacing within the biomedical research community, the Army 
held steady to its policy. In fact, in a 2004 public presentation, WRAIR Science Director 
MD/FACP Alan Magill (2004) declared, “military personnel will die of malaria if MQ is not 
available.” At that point, despite two decades’ worth of criticism about mef-Lariam side effects, 
the CDC still recommended it for most travelers because of its perceived efficacy. Meanwhile, 
the strongest alternatives, doxycycline (with only a 24-hour half-life) and Malarone (expensive 
and not reliable in non-immune travelers) became officially preferred for soldiers with a history 
of depression or traumatic brain injury. At least nineteen official reports of suicide and other 
death from mefloquine have been reported (Croft, 2007, p. 171), and many others have 
speculated about links to the drug in the Fort Bragg murders (Benjamin & Olmsted, 2005; 
Mischler, 2013; Fleet & Mann, 2004). 
In light of the public attention that Lariam was receiving, the FDA added a policy that 
required that a medication guide be included for all mefloquine recipients in 2004. In 2009, the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) determined that mefloquine was neurotoxic, and the Army 
issued a news release stating that it would follow all FDA and CDC recommendations, stating 
that mefloquine was only to be used for patients unable to take doxycycline or Malarone. On 
July 29 2013, the FDA issued a press release with the following headline, “FDA approves label 
changes for antimalarial drug mefloquine hydrochloride due to risk of serious psychiatric and 
nerve side effects,” further stating that “a boxed warning, the most serious warning about these 
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potential problems,” would officially accompany the drug due to persistent and possibly 
permanent neurologic side effects (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: 2013 FDA “black box warning” on mefloquine chloride label 
Following the conversation within the community, the FDA produced new requirements 
for amount and form of written communication to provide to prescribing physicians and 
consumer patients. The Lariam label, as listed in the FDA database, was revised in 1990, 1993, 
1997, 1999, 2002, thrice each in 2003, 2008, and 2009, and once in 2011 before Roche stopped 
manufacturing the drug completely.  
The Army no longer issues mef-Lariam to soldiers, and the drug is no longer marketed in 
the States, although mefloquine chloride remains available under generic names from seven 
other pharmaceutical companies, and the CDC still lists it as one of five recommended 
antimalarial for travelers, citing that it is a “good choice for long trips because it is taken only 
weekly” (CDC, 2011). Several international organizations like Medecins sans Frontieres 
continue to prescribe the drug as its primary antimalarial to American and other employees. 
Ultimately, the drug served to prevent malaria for an uncountable number of persons worldwide. 
It also induced neuropsychiatric problems and their side effects for countless compliant patients 
 60 
 
and their loved ones. At the conjuncture of FDA licensure, uncertain science was only agentive 
in that it pushed regulatory officials to require ineffective label revisions. What was agentive, 
however, was the seductive promise of a chemical compound discovered by American research 
labs at a time of alternative drug resistance.    
Implications. This entire project comes down to facing, confronting, accepting, and 
ultimately communicating uncertainty about biomedicine. If, in a nonmodern object-oriented 
ontology, we can learn to live with the notion that we will never have certainty during drug 
development, then it seems that we would actually become much more comfortable with 
communicating the degree and source of said uncertainty to key stakeholders.  
Scholars in technical communication and rhetoric can serve as intermediaries in these 
complex communication situations. Future studies might seek to define public patient ethics to 
better facilitate the move from internal communication strategies to external public audiences 
and to achieve stasis between these audiences and their use of the topoi safe and effective. By 
understanding the rhetorical situation as well as principles of document design, technical 
communicators offer much, but they cannot succeed by simply reconstructing the black box in a 
new “more correct” way. Writers must enter pharmaceutical communication for the public from 
the black box that each drug is to understand the complications of drug development, particularly 
of those that interfere with the BBB. Indeed, the critique of technical communicators from an 
ANT perspective allows for the large-scale reconsideration of drug development communication 
and procedures based not on the black box of dangerous drugs and their packaging but rather on 
the messiness that is excused in the face of demand for said black boxes.  
Tropical disease research in particular lends itself to serious engagement with themes of 
imperialism and global health communication. While the present study did not investigate the 
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sites and lived experiences of contributing clinical trials abroad, one might expand on this work 
with ethnographic work in these environments to further understand the cultural and 
sociopolitical contexts of clinical trials that are essentially outsourced when western travelers 
develop a need for health solutions that are unique to nonwestern workplaces. The political 
correctness of medical officers in their translation of “sketchy overseas reports” to undetermined 
findings should not be overlooked for scholars engaged in international studies funded 
exclusively by western technocratic nations. A more comprehensive contextualization of clinical 
studies from a culture-centered and nonmodern ontology would illuminate the conflicting 
definitions of ethics in international health campaigns.  
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